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FRAND determination in TCL v. Ericsson and Unwired Planet v.
Huawei: Same same but different?
Peter Georg Picht1
German abstract: Die Entscheidungen Unwired Planet/Huawei (GB)
und TCL/Ericsson (USA) sind für die FRAND-Lizenzierung von SEPs
bemerkenswert, u.a. weil sie eine detaillierte Festlegung von FRAND-
Lizenzgebühren treffen. Bemerkenswert ist aber auch ein Vergleich,
da die Gerichte auf offenbar ähnlicher Faktenbasis zu
unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen gelangen. Der Beitrag konzentriert
sich auf einen Hauptgrund, nämlich den Umgang mit der „top-
down“- bzw. Vergleichslizenzanalyse als zwei Zentralmethoden zur
FRAND-Bestimmung. Er legt u.a. dar, dass die Behandlung
öffentlicher Lizenzkonditionenankündigungen als bindende Zusagen
eher Probleme schafft; dass FRAND-Zusagen unter Geltung von EU-
Recht und in Bezug auf EU-Patente unter Berücksichtigung des EU-
Rechts zu interpretieren sind; dass die beiden Gerichte das
Nichtdiskriminierungserfordernis stark unterschiedlich interpretieren;
und dass eine wertende Gewichtung von Vergleichslizenzen
verzerrend wirken kann. Im vorliegenden Sachverhaltskontext
erscheinen Vergleichslizenzen als die aussagekräftigere FRAND-
Bestimmungsmethode.
Abstract: Unwired Planet/Huawei (UK) and TCL/Ericsson (US) are
remarkable rulings on the FRAND-licensing of SEPs, not least
because they tackle the task of a full-blown FRAND-royalty
determination. Equally remarkable is a comparison between them
since the two courts looked – it seems – at a similar set of facts but
reached quite different results. The present paper focusses on a key
reason for these differing outcomes, namely the courts’ treatment of
“top-down” and “Comparables”, two core approaches in FRAND
royalty calculation. It argues, i.a., that it creates more problems than
solutions to treat the public announcement of royalty rates as a
“pledge”; that FRAND commitments made under EU (Member State)
law and regarding EU patents ought to be interpreted with a view to
EU law; that the two courts interpret the “ND”-requirement
differently; and that the weighing and adjusting of Comparables may
1 Prof. Dr. Peter Georg Picht, LL.M. (Yale), University of Zurich, Affiliated
Research Fellow Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, Munich. The
present paper is based on a comparative study the author produced for the law firm
of Göhmann Rechtsanwälte Partnerschaft mbB.
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be distortive. As to the relative importance of the calculation
approaches, Comparables seem more relevant regarding the facts at
issue.
Keywords: FRAND; SEP; TCL; Unwired Planet; Huawei; Ericsson;
ZTE; top-down; comparables; pledge; Selna; Birss; ETSI; non-
discrimination; hard-edged.
I. Introduction
The licensing of standard-essential patents (SEPs) at fair, reasonable
and non-discriminatory (FRAND) conditions is, at present, a major
issue in patent jurisdictions all across the world. And 2017 was a very
productive year regarding case-law on this type of licenses. Justice
Birss’s ruling in Unwired Planet v. Huawei2 and Judge Selna’s
judgement in TCL v. Ericsson3 were, arguably, the most prominent
decisions from Anglo-American jurisdictions, not least because both
Courts engaged in detailed FRAND royalty calculation, an
undertaking as yet relatively rare in SEP/FRAND case-law.
Although the two cases provide ample opportunity for
comparative discussion, the present paper will focus mainly on their
treatment of two core approaches in FRAND royalty calculation,
namely the so-called “top-down” method and the analysis of
comparable previous licenses (hereinafter also: Comparables). This
aspect is particularly interesting, not only because of its economic
relevance to the parties but also because the two courts looked – it
seems – at a similar set of facts4 but reached, as the paper will show,
quite different results.
The paper aims at making the decisions in their pertinent parts –
long and forbidding in their use of FRAND/SEP jargon as they may
appear to some – more easy to compare and at providing some short
comments that hopefully help to spur a lively and critical discussion.5
2 Unwired Planet International Ltd v Huawei Technologies Co Ltd [2017] EWHC
711 (Pat).
3 TCL Communication Technology Holdings Ltd v Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson,
Nos 8:14-CV-00341 JVS-DFMx, 2:15-CV-02370 JVS-DFMx (CD Cal Sept 21,
2017).
4 In particular, TCL deals with Ericsson-owned SEPs and Ericsson-granted licenses;
TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 4, 5, 54 et seq. UWP focuses on SEPs acquired by Unwired
Planet from Ericsson and on Comparables granted by Ericsson; Unwired Planet v
Huawei (n 2) [382].
5 Besides scope limitations, another important caveat results from the fact that this
paper can rely only on the published versions of the rulings in question which are, in
part, heavily blanked out.
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Inter alia, the paper argues that it creates more problems than
solutions to treat publicly announced royalty rates as a form of
binding “pledge” (cf. below VI.1.), that extensive “mid-point
guessing” by judges can be problematic, and that FRAND
commitments made under EU (Member State) law and regarding EU
patents ought to be interpreted with a view to EU law (cf. below VI.2.,
VII.). It points out how differently the two courts interpret the non-
discrimination requirement of FRAND (cf. below VI.4.), that
categorizing licensees as “local kings” can be a tricky task, and that
the weighing and adjusting of Comparables may distort the results of a
Comparables-based approach (cf. below VI.5.). The paper contends
that the decisions in TCL v Ericsson and Unwired Planet v Huawei
corroborate the role of both top-down analysis and the use of
Comparables as important methods in future case-law on FRAND
license determination. At the same time, it is unlikely that either top-
down or Comparables will – or should – prevail as the exclusive
approach in all complex cases. Regarding the relative importance of
the two methods, Unwired Planet favors Comparables while TCL
looks more favorably at the top-down approach. In the view of the
author, Justice Birss’s position is more convincing regarding the facts
at issue (cf. below VI.6.).
II. Case background
1. Unwired Planet v Huawei
Unwired Planet6 was the first major ruling on SEP/FRAND issues in
England. It resulted from a dispute between Unwired Planet, a
licensing company, and Huawei, a major player in the ICT sector that,
consequently, implements a number of ICT standards in its devices.
The overall dispute can be separated into – so far – six trials: Three
“technical” trials have been completed, each dealing with one patent
and relating to technical issues such as validity, infringement and
essentiality. Another trial concerned the only non-SEP in the portfolio.
The non-technical trial being the subject matter of the decision
discussed here relates to competition law as well as FRAND issues
and involves patents which are declared to be or to become7 standard-
essential patents (SEPs) according to the ETSI IPR Policy. Unwired
Planet’s business model is the licensing of patents to companies who
6 cf n 2; for a review, see Peter Georg Picht, ‘Unwired Planet v. Huawei: A Seminal
SEP/FRAND decision from the UK’ (2017) 12 Oxford JIPLP (10) 867.
7 According to Art. 4.1, “a MEMBER submitting a technical proposal for a
STANDARD or TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION shall, on a bona fide basis, draw
the attention of ETSI to any of that MEMBER's IPR which might be ESSENTIAL if
that proposal is adopted”. The declaration of a patent to ETSI does, therefore, not
necessarily mean that either the patent is standard-essential at the time of its
declaration or the declaration is flawed.
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make and sell telecommunications equipment such as mobile phones
and infrastructure. All these patents were originally granted to
Ericsson and are part of a patent portfolio Claimant obtained from
Ericsson, purportedly encompassing patents essential to various ICT
standards. Defendants in the overall dispute (in particular Huawei,
Google and Samsung) produce and market GSM, UMTS and LTE
based devices. In 2016, Unwired Planet LLC was acquired by
PanOptis, whereas Unwired Planet Inc. changed its name to Great Elm
Capital Group Inc. Claimant’s contacts with the defendants started in
October 2012, a couple of meetings took place and claim charts for
the SEPs were, under the cover of a Non-Disclosure Agreement
(NDA), provided along with some information about previous
litigation. In letters as of September and October 2013, Huawei’s
board was invited to enter into licensing negotiations and ultimately to
reach an agreement, but, in spite of further communications, no
licence was concluded. After the beginning of the proceedings, in
April 2014, Claimant made an open offer to Defendants to licence its
entire global portfolio, including SEPs as well as non-SEPs.
Defendants refused to take a licence, because they contended, on the
one hand, that the patents were not infringed, not essential or invalid
and, on the other hand, that Claimant`s licensing offer was not
FRAND. In addition, Defendants raised defenses and counterclaims
based on Art. 101 TFEU regarding the Master Sale Agreement (MSA)
through which Claimant acquired patents from Ericsson, as well as a
violation of Art. 102 TFEU (abuse of a dominant position). In July
2014, Claimant made a second offer limited to the SEPs in the
portfolio which was also rejected by Defendants due to its non-
FRAND character. Subsequent to directions of the Court in June 2015,
both sides submitted offers containing detailed licensing terms. In
summer 2015, defendant Google settled and defendant Samsung did
the same in summer 2016. As a consequence, Huawei discontinued a
significant part of its counterclaims and certain controversial terms –
in particular the clause on applicable royalty rates – were removed
from the MSA. Since then, the litigation summarized here involves
only Unwired Planet and Huawei. In February 2016, Claimant and
Defendant exchanged open correspondence concerning their lack of
progress in concluding a FRAND licence. In August 2016, Claimant
made a new offer comprising the same terms but lower rates.
Defendant’s offer remained on a per-patent basis. In October 2016,
Defendant submitted another licensing offer, amending the per-patent
royalties and proposing a licence for the whole UWP UK SEP
portfolio. Claimant’s proposal as of August 2016 and Defendant’s
proposal as of October 2016 represent the parties’ positions in the
trial.
Alongside a number of legal and technical patent infringement
issues, Justice Birss had to address the FRAND concept and
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competition law in order to assess the parties’ licensing offers and the
admissibility of injunctive relief.8 After stressing the aim of the
FRAND concept to strike a fair balance between the interests
involved,9 examining the ETSI FRAND undertaking under French
law,10 and discussing whether FRAND is a “range” or a “dot” as well
as emphasizing the “process component” of FRAND,11 the Court
continued to determine a FRAND rate for the case at hand. After
discussing the application of competition law and finding the rules of
competition law not infringed,12 Judge Birss concluded that neither the
licensing offer made by Unwired Planet, nor the one made by Huawei
was FRAND in the aforementioned sense.13 Thus, the Court gave the
parties some additional time to conclude a license in accordance with
the condition set by the Court,14 and issued formal declaration that the
license ultimately framed in the judgement was FRAND.15
2. TCL v Ericsson
TCL v Ericsson,16 involves Ericsson’s portfolio of patents allegedly
essential to ETSI’s 2G, 3G and 4G/LTE mobile phone standards. TCL
is a large manufacturer of mobile phones and other devices which
comply with these standards. In March 2007, TCL affiliates concluded
2G licenses with Ericsson.  In 2011, the parties started negotiating a
3G license.  From 2012 to 2014, Ericsson brought various lawsuits
against TCL for violating Ericsson’s SEPs. In 2014, the parties started
negotiating a 4G license. According to TCL, no offer or counteroffer
made by Ericsson during these negotiations was on FRAND terms. In
March 2014, TCL filed the action at issue here when its initial March
2007 2G license with Ericsson was about to expire. Throughout the
litigation, and preceding a bench trial in February 2017, made several
important decisions relating, inter alia, to the exclusion of
implementation patents from the scope of a FRAND license, to a
global anti-suit injunction, to the taking into consideration of
Ericsson’s cross-license to TCL, to monetary damages for TCL
resulting from an alleged breach of Ericsson’s FRAND commitment,
to the non-binding effect of a previous arbitral award, as well as to
California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) claims and the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. During the course of litigation, Ericsson made
licensing offers, leading to two alternative offers–Option A and
8 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [1]–[3], [12]–[14], [81].
9 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [95].
10 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [98]–[146].
11 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [147]–[69].
12 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [481]–[521].
13 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [522].
14 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [794].
15 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [803].
16 cf n 3.
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Option B–considered by Judge Selna in his FRAND decision. The
Court held that Ericsson’s two final licensing offers were not FRAND,
and therefore adjudicated FRAND terms for a worldwide portfolio
license.17
III. Top-down royalty determination
One of the two core methods applied by both courts is the so-called
“top-down” approach. It sets out by determining an “aggregate royalty
rate” (ARR), viz. the appropriate total royalty burden from licensing
all the intellectual property necessary to implement a standard by, say,
producing and distributing a handheld device. Top-down
determination then shares out this aggregate royalty across all
licensors in proportion to the value of each licensor’s patent portfolio
based on assessing that value as a share of the total relevant patent
portfolio essential to that standard.18
1. Unwired Planet v Huawei
a) The aggregate royalty rate
Justice Birss, in his top-down analysis, is quite hesitant to deduce the
ARR from public statements made by SEP owners. To him, such
statements on the appropriate ARR “have little value in arriving at a
benchmark rate today for a number of reasons. The claims are
obviously self-serving”.19 The decision cites market participants’
statements on ARR ranging from “(low) single-digit percentage of the
sales price” for 4G/LTE, “6-8% for handsets” regarding 4G/LTE, “8
% for 4G”, “5% or less for 3G”.20 Other statements refrain from
directly indicating an ARR but specify the (presumed) share of the
respective patentee in all relevant SEPs, together with a royalty rate
for the patentee’s SEP portfolio.21 The idea of calculating ARRs based
on various sets of these combined figures does not convince Justice
Birss: “[I]f one assumes Alcatel’s 2% royalty claim means they claim
at least 20% of the Relevant SEPs (because in April 2008 Alcatel put
their name to a “single digit percentage aggregate” […]) then the total
shares of Relevant SEPs just mentioned in these statements add up to
about 100% without including other major industry players […]”.22
17 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 6.
18 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [178].
19 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [269].
20 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [264]–[65].
21 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [264].
22 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [269].
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The figures on ARR presented by the parties do not seem
consistent to the Court either: “[T]he combination of Huawei’s
submissions on rates and Huawei’s submissions on what Unwired
Planet’s share of the Relevant SEPs is, shows that in truth Huawei’s
case does not support an aggregate royalty burden of 8%. It supports a
higher total burden than that. Where Huawei undoubtedly have a point
is that the cross-check shows that if Huawei’s case on Unwired
Planet’s share S of SEPs overall (0.30%) is right, the benchmark rate
claimed by Unwired Planet of 0.13% cannot be supported. It would
imply a total burden T of 43%. That is far too much. Conversely if
Unwired Planet are right about their share S of SEPs overall (1.25%),
a benchmark of 0.040% implies a total burden of 3.2%. That is much
less than Huawei themselves are prepared to countenance in these
proceedings”.23 “Furthermore, putting weight in these statements do
[sic!] not take into account what implementers and SEP holders have
actually been content to agree in the intervening years. Compared to
public statements, comparable licences are concrete data points, albeit
their interpretation can be uncertain and the factors derived from them
even more so”.24 Consequently, the decision uses top-down analysis
as a cross-check but no more than that.25
b) SEP in total and in Unwired Planet’s portfolio
As said above, for sharing out whatever the appropriate ARR may be,
it is necessary to know the total number of patents essential to the
pertinent standard(s), the share of a patentee’s SEP portfolio in this
total set of SEPs, and – if the assessment goes beyond mere patent
counting – the relative value (broadly speaking) of the portfolio
patents in comparison with the SEPs outside the portfolio.26 In
Unwired Planet v Huawei, each party presented to Justice Birss its
own approach for determining these elements, Huawei the “HPA” and
Unwired Planet the “Revised MNPA”.27
The Revised MNPA28 identifies all declared SEPs in the
ETSI IPR database, limits this set to the declarations relating to the
standard(s) in question, groups patents into families,29 and filters out
families without a pending or issued US or EP patent. The approach
then selects the most important families by cutting off all patents with
a priority date after 31 December 2008, groups the remaining families
23 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [271]–[72].
24 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [270].
25 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [263], [272].
26 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [180]–[85], [197].
27 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [199].
28 On the following, see Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [274]–[75].
29 A patent „family“ encompasses the patents granted on the same technology by
different jurisdictions, cf Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [201, 546, 548].
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in handset or infrastructure-only patents, and filters30 them to account
for over-declaration and for the fact that some SEPs read not on the
“core” of the standard but on optional or unused features.31
The HPA32 starts out by creating a de-duplicated list of declared
essential patent families (including family members not expressly
declared) from the ETSI database and the Korean
Telecommunications Technology Association database. From this list,
only families including “at least one issued and non-expired patent
and an English or Chinese language member” are selected for further
analysis and grouped corresponding to the standards on which they
read. At the next, vital stage evaluators select – based on a set of
rules33 – a patent from each family as well as one of the pertinent
ETSI standards and review the patent’s essentiality to that standard. If
the evaluator determines that the standard-specification does not
provide a clear reason to rule out the patent as being essential, then the
family is deemed essential.
Both parties leveled harsh criticism against each other’s
approaches and Justice Birss scrutinized them very thoroughly.
Summarizing key points, he found the Revised MNPA’s pre-2009
priority date cut-off to be FRAND but the way in which some value
was attributed to post-2008 patents – namely by applying a 80:20
filter – “so crude as to be arbitrary”.34 While the original (non-revised)
MNPA’s filter for over-declaration was considered reasonable, the
filters for optional and non-deployed features were – in their
combination with the pre-2009 cut-off and the selection of pertinent
standards – held not to be FRAND for lack of empirical basis.35 Due
to this critique, and in order to arrive at an appropriate, combined filter
for all three factors, an expert reviewed two samples of patents, owned
by Samsung and Huawei respectively and indicated by the HPA
method as essential. Spending 5-6 hours per patent family, the expert
arrived at essentiality rates of 16.6% (adjusted to 15.9%) and 9.4%
respectively for these samples, the highest rate of which was then used
30 The original MNPA applied three different filters, for over-declaration,
essentiality to options only, and essentiality to features not deployed. Reacting to
criticisms leveled against the approach in litigation, Unwired Planet adapted the
MNPA and used a single filter accounting for all three factors instead. Together with
a broader selection of pertinent standards, this change resulted in the “Revised
MNPA”, cf Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [274]–[75].
31 Standards contain parts of various relevance (core, parts used only by some
implementers, parts not widely used at all) and, consequently, not all SEPs are
equally “essential”; cf. LG Düsseldorf, 19.1.2016, 4b O 120/14 – Unwired
Planet/Samsung, Rn. 345; LG Düsseldorf, 19.1.2016, 4b O 122/14 – Unwired
Planet/Samsung, Rn. 362.
32 On the following, see Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [286]–[87].
33 On these rules, see Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [286].
34 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [322].
35 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [324]–[32].
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for the Revised MNPA.36 Looking at the various steps the expert took
to determine the relevant samples Justice Birss stated that there “are
significant uncertainties in all these exercises and this is another but it
does not render the technique meaningless”.37
Overall, the “MNPA has flaws but […] the Revised MNPA is a
reasonable attempt to derive information which allows one to assess
the strength of a portfolio of patents declared essential to LTE. […]
One needs to take care with the results because the error bars are wide.
However the results of the MNPA are not meaningless and do not
systematically favour Unwired Planet, as long as one does not think
the results are the true essentiality rates”.38 At the same time, however,
the decision refuses to rely on the MNPA since “with the MNPA,
something like the 80:20 approach is necessary. […] To use the
Revised MNPA fairly demands the incorporation of some step which
gives some value for the patents […]. That is a serious weakness. […]
The complexity of the 80:20 adjustment, layered on top of the
multimode adjustment […] makes the Revised MNPA + 80:20
approach impossible to adjust in a credible manner. The only way it
can be adjusted would be so broad brush that it would be mere
pretence to suggest it was more meaningful than doing my best to just
choose values for S and R somewhere between the parties’
extremes”.39
The HPA approach had originally been run as part of an
arbitration between Ericsson and Huawei, a fact about which the
Court – to its discontent – was not informed from the outset.40 Neither
this point, however, nor the unclear picture of HPA’s role in the
arbitration,41 nor doubts regarding the neutrality of the patent
evaluation42 were the decisive reasons for Justice Birss not to base his
royalty determination on the HPA. He focused on the role the HPA
was initially intended to play in the arbitration between Ericsson and
Huawei, namely that of a “coarse filter to screen out non-essential
patents”,43 a filter that “would err on the side of essentiality since
there was going to be a further detailed study which involved
considering the patented technology and the standard”.44 HPA’s
evaluation exercise was a “huge undertaking” to “produce a pool for
further study”, but could only spend ½ hour per patent family,45 and
Justice Birss finds that the more extensive and careful analysis
36 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [333].
37 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [336].
38 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [366]–[67].
39 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [368]–[70], [375].
40 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [341].
41 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [341].
42 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [343].
43 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [361].
44 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [360].
45 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [345].
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underlying the modified 16.6% filter of the Revised MNPA – again:
an analysis that had spent 5-6 hours per patent family – “is likely to be
closer to the true figure”.46 Still, in his view, “this does not mean the
method is flawed or unreliable. I am satisfied that the HPA has
applied a consistent yardstick and produces meaningful results. It is a
reasonable attempt to deal with over-declaration and derive
information about how many essential patents there really are. […]
However as an absolute value, the numbers from the HPA over-
estimate the true number of essential patents. […]”.47
At the end of his lengthy top-down exercise, Justice Birss’s
reaches the somewhat disenchanted conclusion that he is “satisfied
that both methods produce the wrong answer”.48 Being a judge and
having, therefore, to come to a decision, Justice Birss reverts to his
subjective estimation and judgment, trying to identify a reasonable
weighted mean between the parties’ figures: “The problem is whether
there is a better way to arrive at the right answer than doing my best to
choose values for S and R somewhere between the parties’ extremes.
[…] I have concluded that the right way to reach a conclusion is to
apply adjustments to the figures derived from the HPA. The basis for
the adjustments is my qualitative evaluation of the evidence as a
whole […] The significant overstatement in the HPA is the number
produced for the total pool of Relevant SEPs. The number for 4G
handsets is 1812 and is much too high. The corresponding number in
the Revised MNPA is 355 but that number is much too low if it is to
represent all Relevant SEPs. I think both values are out by about a
factor of two. Half of 1812 is 906 while twice 355 is 710. Splitting the
difference takes one to 800. Standing back, about 800 is fair and in my
judgment an appropriate figure for the pool of 4G/LTE patents”.49
2. TCL v Ericsson
a) TCL’s top-down analysis
In TCL, only the company so named had submitted its own top-down
analysis while Ericsson refrained from doing so and presented,
instead, an “ex-Standard” calculation based on the inherent value of
its portfolio. The ex-Standard method did not find much favor with the
Court50 and is not discussed in greater detail here as it is neither really
a top-down nor a Comparables-based approach.
46 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [362]–[63].
47 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [361].
48 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [374].
49 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [374]–[77]; cf further the passage on the ratio
between Unwired Planet’s and Ericsson’s patent at [379].
50 cf TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 50–54.
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Summarily,51 TCL’s top-down exercise starts out by selecting an
ARR of 6% for 4G and 5% for 2G/3G handsets, then determines the
total number of SEPs for each pertinent standard and ranks “all of
Ericsson’s 192 claim charted patent families on a scale of 1-3 for
essentiality”.52 The analysis then evaluates the importance and
contribution of each essential patent family, checks this view against a
forward-citation analysis, and applies adjustments to the results of
mere SEP counting in order “to reflect the relatively low value of
Ericsson’s patents” and to account for “changes in Ericsson's portfolio
due to acquisitions and expirations”. Finally, the relative strength of
Ericsson’s portfolio for particular regions is determined and TCL’s
sales data are used “to weight the royalty by region and blend the
regional royalties together to create a single global royalty rate for
each standard”.53
b) Aggregate royalty rate
TCL proposed to base the total aggregate royalty on ARR-statements
made by Ericsson and other SEP owners before the adoption of the
respective standards. In the view of the Court these statements are
indeed “important because (1) they were made prior to, or around, the
time the respective standards were being set, such that they reflect the
ex ante expectations of what a reasonable aggregate royalty burden
should be before the standard was adopted and manufacturers are
locked-in; and (2) they were made at a time when Ericsson was both a
licensor and licensee with respect to SEPs that read on handsets, and
thus Ericsson had an incentive to strike a reasonable balance. These
statements were thus intended to provide insight and incentives to
encourage other companies to invest in the standard”.54
Based on statements by Nokia, NTT DoCoMo, Siemens and
Ericsson, “the Court finds that on this record 5% is an appropriate
number to use for the total aggregate royalty for 2G and 3G”.55 As to
4G, the Court relies mainly on announcements made by Ericsson
alone, as well as together with other companies, and predicting an
ARR that consists of a single-digit percentage of the sales prices, more
precisely 6-8% of the price for a 4G-based handset.56 Regarding the
legal nature of these announcements the court takes the remarkable
position that “Ericsson's statements were thus not a hope or prediction,
but a pledge to the market that if the market adopted Ericsson's
51 On the following, see TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 15–16.
52 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 15–16.
53 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 16.
54 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 19.
55 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 20–22.
56 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 22.
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championed standard, the total aggregate royalties would be
calculated as described above”.57
Assuming that ARR announcements really are binding pledges
leads to the question whether they are binding under all circumstances
or whether later developments may permit to adjust the pledge. The
Court declines to adjust on the facts of the case, but not in general:
“The Court would have certainly considered applying a higher total
aggregate royalty than the one initially announced by Ericsson if
Ericsson had provided evidence that showed the value of subsequent
additions to each standard”. 58
Although it puts so much weight on patentee-announcements,
the Court decides to disregard statements made by other patentees:
“The publicly declared rates in 2010 from just nine SEP owners
totaled 14.8% of the handset selling price. However, these figures
were volunteered by individual companies, virtually all of whom had
yet to convince anyone to pay anything close to these rates because
the first connection between an 4G device and a 4G network only
occurred in October 2009. […] In addition, no one was checking
whether the individual rates that companies announced were fair,
reasonable, or based on anything other than a desire to maximize
royalty revenue. Simply totaling individually announced rates plays
into the trap of stacking, a vice which standardization seeks to
avoid”.59
c) SEPs in total and in Ericsson’s portfolio
After having thus established an ARR, Judge Selna turns to
determining the total number of relevant SEPs, as well as Ericsson’s
share of these SEPs, so as to be able to apportion a share of the ARR
to the company. The main source for evaluating the total number of
SEPs is a study which TCL submitted, and which seems to have been
similar to the HPA approach in UWP. Scrutinizing this study, the
Court accepts the exclusion of patent families containing no patent in
English while it considers it an – although potentially necessary –
error to exclude families that contained only expired patents.60
Nonetheless, the “Court is satisfied that the subset actually examined
was a reasonable surrogate for the whole”.61
57 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 24.
58 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 19–20. On the relevance of dropping prices for standard-
based products, see TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 25.
59 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 24.
60 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 28.
61 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 28.
Peter Georg Picht FRAND determination in TCL
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 18-07
13
Neither trigger the rather limited assessment resources invested
per patent or the evaluators’ awareness of the involved parties serious
misgivings: “Ericsson argued that [the evaluators] must have spent on
average about 20 minutes per patent, and charged $100, and this is
plainly insufficient. By way of contrast, Via Licensing for example
charges $10,000 to determine whether a single patent is essential
before accepting the patent into a patent pool. The Court is not
persuaded that the tasks for which Concur IP charged are comparable
to the task performed by Via Licensing. Patent pools ask customers to
pay for each specific patent in the pool, so the greater the certainty in
their process and the stronger the patents the more they can charge and
convince customers and patent owners to join. […] Patent pools
therefore require substantially greater certainty than is necessary or
reasonable for counting the number of SEPs in a standard. While
charging on average only $100 per patent family may be cheap, this
process is only intended to provide a workable size of the relevant
universe and has no need to be as precise as a licensing pool must
be”.62 “In a similar vein, while it would have been better had the team
not known who the parties were in this case, there is no requirement
that an essentiality study be conducted in a blind manner”.63
“[M]ore salient” are, in the view of the Court, Ericsson’s
concerns that the evaluators read the patent claims but not the patent
specification, meaning that they “may not have noticed if a patent
contained a means plus functions claim, likely would not have noticed
if a patent used its own lexicography, and would not have read any
specification disclaimer or the file history”.64 Somewhat surprisingly,
though, and maybe due in part to perceived shortcomings in
Ericsson’s own claim chart submissions65 the Court seems not to
follow up in detail on these concerns: “While Ericsson's concerns
regarding means plus function claims, lexicography, and specification
disclaimers could be substantial, they could also be entirely trivial.
The Court declines to speculate on how often they would impact the
essentiality determination”.66 While the Court thus comes to the
conclusion that “the flaws are not enough to justify rejecting TCL's
experts' calculation of the total number of SEPs entirely”, it adjusts the
numbers by way of comparing them with a SEP examination
undertaken by two other experts whose results were equally submitted
by TCL.67
62 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 30.
63 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 31.
64 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 31.
65 cf TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 31 n 20, criticizing that Ericsson initially claimed 235
essential patent families but lowered that number down to 179 at trial.
66 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 31.
67 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 32.
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As to the number of SEPs owned by Ericsson, “the Court chose
to apply the top down formula twice, using TCL's conceded number of
SEPs, and using Ericsson's disputed number of SEPs. This more
accurately reflects the reality faced by parties in a licensing
negotiation who each have different views how many SEPs the
licensor owns”.68 Results were also adjusted for differing portfolio
strengths in the US, Europe and the “Rest of the World”.69 As to SEPs
issued to or acquired by Ericsson during the license term, “the Court
agrees that newly issued patents will not make a significant difference
to Ericsson's overall proportional share. Even assuming new patents
will be added to each standard during the license, there is no evidence
that Ericsson will be more successful in obtaining SEPs in the next
five years than it has been in the past. […] Thus, Ericsson's newly
acquired SEPs will be offset by SEPs being added to the standard”.70
Patents that expired before the FRAND license which the Court was
asked to determine begins do not count into Ericsson’s SEP portfolio
since “United States patent law does not permit Ericsson to demand
value for patents that have expired. […] Because the FRAND
undertaking is an encumbrance and commitment that exists on top of
national patent systems, FRAND cannot permit what domestic patent
law prohibits”.71
d) Valuation
After ascertaining the overall and Ericsson’s SEP portfolio
respectively, the next step in the top-down analysis submitted by TCL
consists in an attempt to classify Ericsson’s patents according to their
“importance and contribution”, viz. their value compared to other
SEPs. This valuing exercise does, however, not find much favor with
the Court, being considered “too flawed to be used to calculate the
overall rates which the Court derives from the top down analysis”.72
The four main perceived flaws consisted, firstly, in the fact that
the value analysis was applied only to Ericsson’s patents and not to
the other SEPs as well.73 Second, the Court agrees, in principle, that
SEP value is driven down by the availability of alternative
technologies at the time the standard is set.74 It disagrees, however,
with the way TCL’s approach took into account the mere existence of
any alternative technology as it “did not analyze whether [the]
68 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 33.
69 On this, see TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 43–46.
70 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 35.
71 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 35, with reference to Brulotte v Thys Co 379 US 29, 32
(1964).
72 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 38.
73 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 41.
74 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 41.
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alternatives are mutually inconsistent with each other, would perform
worse than the standard, would even create a viable, functional
standard, or require other patents owned by Ericsson (thus defeating
the point of the analysis). […] How much proposed alternatives will
affect the value of a patent depends on a number of variables,
including whether the alternative is unpatented, expired, part of the
previous standard, owned by another company that lets manufacturers
use it for free or at a low rate, an entity that aggressively protects its
intellectual property, or by the company itself”.75 Third, Judge Selna
sees no sufficient scientific or empirical basis for the value/importance
tiers into which the SEPs are grouped.76 And fourth, “the Court is not
persuaded by [the] forward citation analysis” used as a check since its
“results generally contradicted the importance and contribution
analysis […] . It does not appear that any other court or company has
used a forward citation analysis for such a task, and it is unclear
whether companies would have the same incentives to cite to potential
prior art, particularly in the context of multiple standards”.77
e) The Court’s overall view
In sum, “because the Court has found fatal flaws with certain steps in
TCL's top down approach, it does not accept [its] final numbers”.78
“However, the Court uses the data it did accept to construct a number
of rates based on different assumptions and approaches”.79 Instead of
TCL’s (partially) qualitative analysis, “[t]he Court adopts a simple
patent counting system which treats every patent as possessing
identical value, and then applies the numbers that it found reliable
from the analyses provided by TCL's experts”.80
IV. Comparables
Assessing Comparables serves as the second main FRAND
determination methodology in TCL v Ericsson and Unwired Planet v
Huawei alike. Comparables can arguably inform FRAND
determination in three – closely interconnected – ways,81 only two of
75 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 41–42, with reference to In re Innovatio IP Ventures LLC
Patent Litig, No 11 C 9308 (ND Ill Oct 3, 2013).
76 For details, see TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 42.
77 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 42–43.
78 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 43.
79 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 16.
80 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 16–17.
81 Justice Birss’s distinction between the relevance of Comparables as data points in
assessing the “FR”-prong of FRAND and their role in deciding upon the “ND”-
prong shows nicely the various roles Comparables can play in FRAND
determination; Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [489].
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which were used in Unwired Planet and TCL v Ericsson. Firstly, their
conditions provide data points showing how the market values a
particular patent portfolio.82 Since the “fair” and “reasonable”
conditions for licensing a portfolio are not preordained by the gods but
depend on the economic potential a licensee can reap by using the
licensed technologies and since the licensee’s willingness to offer the
patent holder cash and non-cash benefits expressed in the licensing
conditions is directly related to this potential the Comparables’
conditions are – if agreed upon in undistorted negotiations (cf. below)
– quite valid indicators for the “FR” prong of FRAND.
Secondly, when combined with information on the market
position and other characteristics of the licensees, Comparables
become the single most important reference for assessing the “ND”
prong of FRAND. Whether the offered licensing conditions
discriminate a particular licensee can be assessed only against the
background of conditions offered to and agreed with other licensees
because the differences in the conditions of the licenses and the
divergence or similarity between the licensees are decisive for this
assessment. This is true even for a “soft-edged” reading of non-
discrimination in the sense of UWP because in order to assess whether
the “benchmark” license conditions were offered to a particular
licensee it is relevant to know the conditions offered to other players.
Thirdly, Comparables can also have an informative value with
regard to the “procedural” aspect of FRAND. Both Justice Birss83 and
Judge Selna84 attribute much importance to this aspect which focuses
not so much on the content of a SEP license but rather on the bona
fide-conduct of the parties in negotiating the license.85 This deserves
support because a key goal of the FRAND mechanism, the peaceable
and effective conclusion of license contracts providing a reliable
framework for standard-based market activity, cannot be achieved
without parties acting in a proactive and cooperative manner. Party
conduct can, for instance, be FRANDly regarding the timeliness of
responses to the other party’s offers or communications, the level of
relevant information provided to the counterpart, or a party’s overall
negotiation/litigation strategy. Whether party action qualifies as
FRAND in these respects has a lot to do with – as the CJEU put it –
“recognised commercial practice”86 in the respective market.87 At this
82 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [170].
83 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [162]–[63].
84 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 111–12.
85 Regarding Unwired Planet, see Picht, ‘Unwired Planet v. Huawei’ (n 6) 876–79;
Jorge L Contreras, ‘Global Markets, Competition, and FRAND Royalties: The
Many Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei’ (2017) 17-AUG Antitrust Source
1, 4–5.
86 Case C–170/13 Huawei Technologies Co Ltd v ZTE Corp, EU:C:2015:477 [2015],
para 65.
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point, Comparables and, in particular, the way in which they were
concluded come into play because they can document patterns of
customary market behavior.
1. Unwired Planet v Huawei
a) Underlying concept of non-discrimination
The key background for understanding what Unwired Planet v
Huawei has to say on Comparables is Justice Birss’s two-pronged
concept of non-discrimination. He distinguishes between a “general”
or “soft-edged” non-discrimination obligation and a “hard-edged” one.
“The general non-discrimination obligation is […] part of an overall
assessment of the inter-related concepts making up FRAND by which
one can derive a royalty rate applicable as a benchmark. This rate is
non-discriminatory because it is a measure of the intrinsic value of the
portfolio being licensed but it does not depend on the licensee. The
hard-edged non-discrimination obligation, to the extent it exists, is a
distinct factor capable of applying to reduce a royalty rate (or adjust
any licence term in any way) which would otherwise have been
regarded as FRAND. This will take into account the nature of the
particular licensee seeking to rely on it”.88
b) General non-discrimination
Looking first at general non-discrimination, Justice Birss speaks in
favor of including rather more than less licenses as Comparables into
the assessment.89 As general criteria for compatibility, Justice Birss
states that the licensor must be identical and that the license must be a
“recent” one. He doubts, however, “that the identity of the licensee
should be a strong factor in determining what comparables are useful
for determining the FRAND rate aside from the hard edged non-
discrimination point […]. Different licensees will have differing levels
of bargaining power. […] It would be unfair (and discriminatory) to
assess what is and is not FRAND by reference to this and other
characteristics of specific licensees […]. In my judgment the FRAND
rate ought to be generally non-discriminatory in that it is determined
primarily by reference to the value of the patents being licensed and
has the result that all licensees who need the same kind of licence will
be charged the same kind of rate”.90 Nonetheless, the decision
87 Peter Georg Picht, ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and
issues post-Huawei’ (2016) 37 ECLR (9) 365, 370–71.
88 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [177].
89 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [173].
90 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [175].
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mentions some further aspects, such as the worldwide activity of a
licensee91 or a general decline in handheld prices.92 Geographical
scope of the licenses, on the contrary, is not intensely discussed but
this may have to do with the fact that, apparently, all licenses before
Justice Birss – and, potentially, also before Judge Selna93 – were of a
worldwide scope anyway.94 Changes in the legal landscape since the
conclusion of a Comparable – such as a reduced likelihood for the
patentee to get an injunction against an infringing standard-
implementer95 – can reduce this license’s relevance and suggest that it
may serve as a template for the FRAND license-to-be-determined
only when appropriately modified.96
When assessing the comparability of specific licenses, the
decision looks, accordingly, not so much at the licensee’s market
position and characteristics in general but rather at whether the license
is informative regarding the inherent value of the licensed portfolio.97
This can depend on the license’s conditions, for instance the way in
which royalties are framed,98 but also on the circumstances under
which the license was concluded. Regarding, in particular, the
Unwired Planet-Samsung license, the Court takes into consideration
strategic benefits PanOptis – then the owner of Unwired Planet –
expected from granting Samsung advantageous license conditions, a
circumstance that led to royalties lower than justified given the
portfolio’s inherent value.99 The decision not to admit the 2016 license
between Ericsson and Huawei as a Comparable was also based on the
circumstances of its conclusion, namely the fact that this license
resulted from an arbitral award, the full text of which (in particular the
reasoning) were not available to Justice Birss.100 Regarding the 2014
Ericsson-Samsung license, Justice Birss ponders whether its
conclusion was overshadowed by previous litigation and admits the
license as Comparable because he believes it was not.101 Although the
decision also considers Samsung’s economic strength, size and
sophistication,102 it does so not in order to decide whether Samsung
belongs to a camp of comparable licensees in general but to assess
91 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [446].
92 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [453].
93 Both decisions seem to look at quite similar, potentially even the same licenses
and licensees. The local king-concept in TCL does not necessarily rule out a
worldwide scope of the license of a local king as the court looks, in this respect, at
where the bulk of the sales take place, not at the language of the license contract.
94 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [152].
95 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [432].
96 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [430]–[32].
97 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [382] et seq.
98 See, for instance, Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [383] et seq.
99 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [390]–[409], in particular [408]–[09].
100 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [411].
101 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [420].
102 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [420].
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whether the particular license at issue was concluded in an undistorted
negotiation process.
c) Hard-edged non-discrimination
Justice Birss’s argumentation regarding hard-edged non-
discrimination is quite subtle.103 In a nutshell, it considers, at the
outset, what the competition law concept of non-discrimination is and
whether a hard-edged element in the “ND” prong of ETSI’s FRAND
commitment – assuming such an element exists – ought to be
interpreted in the same way. Then, however, Justice Birss rejects a
hard-edged reading of ETSI’s “ND” commitment whilst reserving the
application of EU competition law in this respect. Nonetheless, the
decision assesses whether Unwired Planet had violated a hard-edged
non-discrimination obligation were one – unlike Justice Birss – to read
such an obligation into the ETSI FRAND commitment.
As summarized by Birss, the competition law non-
discrimination requirement rests on the principle “that comparable
situations must not be treated differently and different situations must
not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified”.104
According to Article 102(c) TFEU, applying dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties are unlawful “where
it is shown that there are (a) equivalent/comparable transactions; (b)
resulting in an actual or potential distortion of competition; and (c)
absence of objective justification. [T]ransactions are comparable if (a)
they are concluded with purchasers who compete with one another, or
who produce the same or similar goods, or who carry out similar
functions in distribution, (b) they involve the same or similar products,
(c) in addition their other relevant commercial features do not
essentially differ”.105
Parties and their experts in the Unwired Planet case agreed that
the FRAND commitment “means that licensors should treat similarly
situated licensees similarly”106 and that “concepts such as similarly
situated parties, equivalent/comparable transactions, and objective
justification, were the same under the non-discrimination limb of
FRAND as they are in competition law [although] none of those
concepts are mentioned expressly in the ETSI FRAND
undertaking”.107 They disagreed, however, on “whether distortion of
competition is part of the non-discrimination limb of FRAND”.108
103 On the following, see Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [481] et seq.
104 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [486].
105 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [486].
106 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [485].
107 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [487].
108 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [495].
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Observing a lack of case-law authority109 and conducting a thorough
analysis of the issue,110 Justice Birss finds that a hard-edged non-
discrimination obligation – if read into ETSI’s FRAND commitment –
should encompass a distortion of competition requirement, so as not to
exercise too rigid a control on price differentiation: “Competition law
does not seek to prohibit different prices being charged to different
customers. An important aspect of the way that result is assured in
competition law is by the requirement that only terms which are
sufficiently dissimilar to distort competition are prohibited. In other
words, the various elements of the competition law applicable [to]
discriminatory pricing operate as a whole to achieve a fair balance.
Splitting off some parts without the others is unbalanced and risks
unfairness”.111 The absence of an explicit reference to the requirement
in the wording of ETSI’s FRAND commitment provides no valid
counter-argument in the Court’s view as the same is true for the other
– party-conceded – elements of a hard-edged non-discrimination
requirement.112
This being said, however, the decision takes quite a sudden turn
and jettisons hard-edged non-discrimination altogether as far as
ETSI’s FRAND declaration is concerned: “[I]t is not necessary to read
this hard-edged nondiscrimination obligation into the ETSI FRAND
undertaking at all provided one takes a benchmark rate approach to
assessing a royalty under the ETSI FRAND undertaking”.113 Parties
can arguably bring the hard-edged non-discrimination issue as a
matter of competition law, though, because “[c]ompetition law will
always be available in an appropriate case”.114
In its next part, the decision discusses nonetheless whether
Unwired Planet has violated a hard-edged non-discrimination
requirement, if such a requirement were to be read into ETSI’s
FRAND declaration.115 Comparing the license conditions offered to
Huawei with an Unwired Planet-Samsung license that formed the
main reference point of the parties’ arguments Justice Birss finds
similarity between Samsung and Huawei,116 as well as dissimilar
treatment of the licensees by Unwired Planet given, mainly, the
109 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [496].
110 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [495]–[503].
111 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [501].
112 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [495].
113 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [502].
114 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [502].
115 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [503]: “If, contrary to this view, the FRAND
undertaking also includes a specific non-discrimination obligation whereby a
licensee has the right to demand the very same rate as has been granted to another
licensee which is lower than the benchmark rate, then that obligation only applies if
the difference would distort competition between the two licensees”.
116 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [488].
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difference in royalties they (would) have to pay.117 However, Justice
Birss rejects a distortion of competition given that the relative
difference in royalty rates between the licenses was large but
amounted only to a very small percentage of the margins on the
relevant products.118
2. TCL v Ericsson
a) General considerations
It is mainly for the assessment of FRAND’s “ND” prong that Judge
Selna looks at Comparables. As to the concept of non-discrimination
“the Court finds that harm to the competitor firm offered
discriminatory rates is sufficient. […] Ericsson would [like to] engraft
into the FRAND analysis the distinction which American antitrust law
makes between the harm to competition, which is actionable, and
mere harm to a competitor which is not. [But t]he Sherman Act and its
long history provide no guide to understanding ETSI's non-
discrimination under FRAND“.119 After stating that “[n]o American
cases have definitively addressed the non-discrimination
requirement”, Judge Selna relies on the testimony of French law
experts – as he deems the ETSI FRAND declaration to be governed by
French law – for his finding that “different rates offered to different
licensees may well be FRAND given the economics of the specific
license”.120
b) The similarly situated firms
Given the parties’ agreement that the non-discrimination aspect
requires similarly situated firms to be offered like, or close to like
rates, the “Court identifies the relevant firms, and then analyzes their
rates to test [the conditions offered by Ericsson] for discrimination”.121
In determining what would be a similarly situated company,
Judge Selna favors a broad interpretation122 and concludes that, on a
general level, the analysis should include all firms reasonably well
established in the world market.123 As to specific assessment factors,
Judge Selna deems relevant the geographic scope of a company, the
117 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [490]–[95].
118 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [518]–[19].
119 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 91.
120 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 109.
121 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 54.
122 For the reasoning on this point, see TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 56 et seq.
123 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 56.
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technology it uses, the licenses the company required, and a
reasonable sales volume. In contrast, he considers irrelevant the
company’s overall financial success or risk, brand recognition, the
operating system used by an implementer’s devices, and the existence
of retail stores operated by the implementer.124 An important issue lies
in the treatment of a company’s place in the value chain – on the one
hand the decision declares this factor to be relevant in principle.125 In
fact, the value chain position can be of considerable impact. As an
important example, royalty rates and other license conditions are
usually different on the wholesale and on the retail level, leading to
different outcomes when pre-existing licenses are unpacked and
FRAND rates calculated based on one or the other royalty base.126 If,
therefore, it is correct that the TCL court considered, in some
instances, retail prices where it should have considered wholesale
prices,127 this issue may well have distorted the FRAND calculation
result.
Among the relevant factors, the Court found geographic scope
to be the most important one in this case128 and distinguishes between
global companies and “local kings”. Local kings “sell most or all of
their devices in a single country”.129 In consequence, they require – in
the Court’s opinion – a different type of license than a global
company: While the global company needs a worldwide license and
may get a blended rate given different patents and value thereof in
different countries, the local king can operate on a single country
license.130
Regarding very large players, such as Apple or Samsung, the
decision affirms comparability with smaller market participants: “The
Court cannot identify any dispositive reason why Apple and Samsung
are not similarly situated to TCL with regard to Ericsson's SEPs. All
three firms are global firms, Ericsson has asked all three to pay a
global blended rate for a multi-modal 4G license, they all create
phones of similar technical specifications, and they all have
substantial sales volume. […] The prohibition on discrimination
124 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 57–58.
125 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 57, 72.
126 David Long: Judge Selna will make minor changes to FRAND ruling (TCL v.
Ericsson), February 13, 2018, https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2018/02/judge-
selna-will-make-minor-changes-frand-ruling-tcl-v-ericsson/ (last accessed April 16,
2018).
127 David Long: Judge Selna will make minor changes to FRAND ruling (TCL v.
Ericsson), February 13, 2018, https://www.essentialpatentblog.com/2018/02/judge-
selna-will-make-minor-changes-frand-ruling-tcl-v-ericsson/ (last accessed April 16,
2018).
128 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 59.
129 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 59.
130 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 59. It is this distinction which causes the Court to exclude
Karbonn and Coolpad because it considers them to be local kings given that they sell
most of their products in India and China respectively; TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 59.
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would mean very little if the largest, most profitable firms could
always be a category unto themselves simply because they were the
largest and most profitable firms”.131
As a result of its considerations, the Court identifies six
“similarly situated” firms, namely Apple, Samsung, LG, HTC,
Huawei, and ZTE.132 While the parties agreed on the similarity of
Huawei, LG, HTC, and ZTE, only TCL wanted to include Apple and
Samsung while only Ericsson wanted to include Coolpad and
Karbonn.133 Within the group of similarly situated firms, however, the
Court distinguishes by stating that it finds the rates in the licenses with
Apple and Huawei “informative, but declines to use them for a direct
comparison in the FRAND analysis” because these licenses came into
effect after Ericsson made its licensing offers to TCL. Amongst other
reasons, “as a practical matter, Ericsson could not have been expected
to factor into [its offers to TCL] rates that had yet to be
determined”.134
c) Unpacking the Comparables
In order to compare the licenses concluded with the “similarly
situated” companies, the Court first “unpacks” them, in particular by
translating their royalty arrangements into a one-way percentage
royalty without caps or floors.135 While it is surprised that the
conclusions of the parties’ experts “largely agreed and were rarely
widely disparate”,136 the Court also declares it is “very cognizant of
just how easy it is to pick particular assumptions or approaches in
order to manipulate the unpacking analysis to arrive at a preferred rate
for each license”.137 Sometimes, unpacking failed altogether, for
instance regarding 2G rates.138
Instead of analyzing details of the unpacking exercise the
present paper merely points out four of its (particularly important)
aspects: First, the Court views released sales-payments – i.e.
compensatory payments for past unlicensed sales – “as part and parcel
131 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 60–61.
132 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 54.
133 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 58.
134 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 91.
135 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 54–55.
136 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 61.
137 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 64. Another layer of complexity is added by the fact that the
Court’s methodology unpacked Comparables to a global royalty rate “while the top
down analysis resulted in a U.S. rate, along with a modification for sales outside the
United States which will also have to be added. In order to compare rates calculated
from the top down analysis and the comparable license analysis, the comparable
license rates must be converted to U.S. rates”, cf TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 95.
138 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 103.
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of the forward-looking terms of the license agreements”,139 calculating
their FRAND level based on the same formula that applies to the
forward-looking royalty payments.140 Second, the Court stresses both
the need and the difficulty to apportion lump sum payments, which
almost all Comparables contain, between multiple standards. “[E]ach
apportionment will affect each later standard, and the more
assumptions the experts made, the more the license reflects the
expert's decisions rather than the parties' agreed upon royalties
rates”.141
Third, the Court decides not to integrate dollar-per-unit rates,
caps or floors into the license-to-be-determined.142 Regarding, in
particular, caps or floors, Judge Selna perceives “no support in the
record that a package of SEPs has a fixed, determinable value which
would justify a fixed dollar-per-unit rate or a percentage rate as
modified by floors or caps. [E]xisting caps and floors are solely the
product of negotiations, not any sort of analysis of whether they are
fair or reasonable. To be sure, in the course of private negotiations,
parties may enter into a variety of licensing schemes that reflect each
party's unique assessment of the risk of a particular arrangement.
However, the Court prefers to conduct its FRAND analysis on
principles of general application which do not require the Court to
discern the peculiarities of those risk assessments”.143
Finally, both parties and their experts agreed on the need to
introduce a factor called “Portfolio Strength Ratio” (PSR) which
measures “the strength of Ericsson's SEP portfolio relative to the
licensee's SEP portfolio, on a standard-by-standard basis”. In order to
do so, however, TCL counted SEPs in the respective portfolios
whereas Ericsson counted (approved) contributions, i.e. technological
solutions proposed by a standardization participant during the
standard-setting process.144 While voicing doubts over the validity of a
mere counting approach,145 the Court favors counting patents instead
of contributions: “Patent counting, while not perfect, does reflect the
number of SEPs that are owned by each company. In addition, patent
counts will reflect changes to a company's portfolio from purchases,
expirations, and transfers of SEPs”.146 In contrast, “Contributions can
be made for ideas that are unpatented, unpatentable, patented by
someone else, or split into multiple contributions. […] The two major
flaws with contribution counting are the absence of any evidence that
139 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 66.
140 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 104–105.
141 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 66–67.
142 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 68–69.
143 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 69.
144 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 73–74.
145 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 74.
146 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 74.
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it corresponds to actual intellectual property rights, and its inability to
account for transferred or expired patents”.147
V. Relation between top-down approach and Comparables
Overall, Justice Birss holds the top-down approach in rather low
esteem. As a general concern he notes that “via the valuation experts
and in their submissions both sides presented the court with a blizzard
of figures. […] A frequent problem is in keeping track of the bases on
which numbers are presented so as to try and make sure one is
comparing like with like”.148
Judge Selna’s view on the top-down method seems more
favorable although it does not accept it as the exclusive FRAND
determination approach: “The appeal of a top down approach is that it
prevents royalty stacking. […] If the total aggregate royalty is
properly based upon the total value of the patents in the standard, it
can also prevent hold-up because it prevents SEP owners from
charging a premium for the value added by standardization. […] A top
down method, however, cannot address discrimination as the Court
interprets the term, and is not necessarily a substitute for a market-
based approach that considers comparable licenses”.149 Instead, “the
comparable licenses and top down analysis act as a reasonable check
on each other”.150 “[L]icenses are a proper measure for determining
whether an offered rate meets the FRAND requirements, but not the
exclusive measure. […] Actual licenses to the patented technology at
issue are probative as to what constitutes a fair and reasonable royalty
for those patent rights because such actual licenses reflect the
economic value of the patented technology in the market place”.151 At
the same time, the Court underlines the intricacies present in every
attempt to determine FRAND license conditions: “Before turning to
the royalty setting analyses advanced by the parties' experts, the Court
makes one central observation as the fact finder in this case. The
search for precision and absolute certainty is a doomed undertaking.
[…] The complexity of the analyses and the number of variable
components inevitably lead to criticism”.152
147 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 75.
148 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [227].
149 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 15.
150 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 98.
151 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 109–110.
152 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 14. Cf. also TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 99, 101.
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VI. Comments
Even the limited comparison between TCL v Ericsson and Unwired
Planet undertaken in this paper indicates a plethora of interesting legal
and economic topics. Far from being able to address all of them, the
following comments focus on aspects which may be of particular
relevance to future FRAND-determination case-law.
1. ARR-determination in top-down analysis
When trying to determine an aggregate royalty rate as the starting
point of a top-down royalty calculation, both Justice Birss and Judge
Selna look at public announcements on royalty rates made by SEP
holders. The importance and legal function which the two judges are
willing to accord to them is, however, quite different. Being deeply
skeptical whether patentee-announcements are reliable indicators,
Justice Birss seems not ready to accord them more than an informative
role. TCL v Ericsson, on the contrary, goes much farther where it
considers Ericsson’s public announcements as some sort of binding
“pledge” to actually grant the announced rates in individual licenses.
This position provokes numerous follow-on questions. One of
them goes to the legal basis for a binding effect of the royalty
announcement. Does, in particular, the announcement constitute a
third-party beneficial contract as it is the case (in the view of Judge
Selna) with ETSI’s FRAND commitment? Or is the binding effect
rather estoppel-based? Does it follow from one or both of these
options that a transferee is – for instance after having acquired the
respective SEP portfolio – equally bound to the announced rates?
Another question relates to the viewpoint from which a “royalty
pledge” ought to be construed. Both a contractual and an estoppel
interpretation of the “pledge” would probably suggest asking what the
addressees of the announcement, i.e. (potential) implementers and
licensees, could have reasonably understood it to mean. Can they, for
instance, reasonably expect rates to drop in the course of a standard’s
lifecycle although the announcement makes no explicit mention of
such a drop? Must they understand the announcement of single-figure
royalty rates or rate ranges as relating to global (blended) licenses or
can they expect regional discounts – as applied by TCL – although the
announcement makes no mention of such regional differences? Do
royalty announcements cover single mode or – as the TCL court seems
to assume153 – multimode devices if they do not explicitly clarify this
point? Are they intended to be binding “forever” or for a limited
153 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 22, 26. On the single-mode/multi-mode content of royalty
announcements, see also Eric Stasik, les Nouvelles 2010, 114 ff.
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period of time? Of the construing effort necessary to answer such
intricate questions one finds rather little in the TCL decision. Instead,
it is more the judge’s than the addressees’ viewpoint that seems to
matter in interpreting the announcement.
Conditions integrated ex-ante into the “pledge”, as well as ex-
post modifications based on a subsequent change of circumstances,
present a related issue. The TCL decision appears to leave room for
them where it states that Ericsson could have conditioned its
announced rates on a particular dollar-per-unit return154 and that
increasing the ARR ex-post can be legitimate in the event of additions
to the standard.155 Furthermore, the option to make conditional
announcements squares with contract law’s fundamental principal that
a party chooses the content of its offers. Were a binding effect of
public royalty announcements, together with the option to include
conditions, really to become the law, patentees would clearly see the
incentive to either not make royalty announcements at all or subject
them to all sorts of conditions and caveats. If they chose the first
option, a guiding effect of royalty announcements to the market would
be lost. If they chose the latter, the law would have to decide whether
and where the FRAND concept sets boundaries as to which conditions
are permissible. Turning from future to past announcements, would it
be legitimate to give them an (unconditionally) binding effect
although TCL v Ericsson’s “pledge approach” seems not to have
formed part of (US) FRAND license law so far and patentees could
therefore not foresee the ramifications of their doing? If this seemed
too far-reaching, should pre-TCL v Ericsson announcements have no
binding effect at all or should the effect be attenuated by reading into
the “pledge” conditions or subsequent modifications reasonably to be
expected by its addressees?
As one broadens the view and introduces multiple patentee-
“pledgees”, the question marks become even more numerous. An
assumption that each patentee is bound by its individual
announcement and that the patentee has some leeway in framing this
announcement could result in differing ARRs for different patentees.
Evidently, such an outcome contradicts the concept of a coherent, top-
down determined royalty framework for all SEP holders in the
respective market, endangers the goal to prevent royalty-stacking
(since patentees may race for higher ARR “pledges”), and tends to
disincentivize reasonable, FRAND-oriented ARR announcements. By
extrapolating ARRs resulting from combined patentee-
announcements, Justice Birss shows nicely that some of them are
certainly not an appropriate starting point for top-down calculation.
Adjusting, instead, the individual announcements into a blended,
uniform ARR does largely away with the concept of a contract- or
154 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 25.
155 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 19–20.
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estoppel-based “pledge” because it removes (most of) a patentee’s
freedom to decide upon the content of its offer/promise. Furthermore,
it then becomes necessary to specify the source from which a uniform
ARR springs. TCL v Ericsson selects some announcements as relevant
and discards others as insignificant, but the criteria for doing so are
not entirely clear and convincing. Why, for instance, do nine
individual patentee announcements made in the year 2010 not qualify
while Ericsson’s individual 2008 announcement does?156 The decision
suggests it is because the 2010 announcements were made too early,
before the standard was really being implemented.157 However,
Ericsson’s statements date from an even earlier point in time. The
Court further stresses that Ericsson made its announcements to
convince the market to use one of several competing standards. But,
first, this may also be true for the 2010 announcements since the
standard was not successfully implemented at this point in time either.
And, second, it can be hard for patentees to perceive whether the
existence of competing standards (not an altogether rare event) creates
an environment which turns their royalty announcements into binding
“pledges”. Nor should it matter that the statements came from
individual SEP holders and were, naturally, driven by their individual
interests because this constitutes an inherent feature of each “pledge”-
based approach. If, however, the crux lies in the level of the declared
ARR – and this seems the case in TCL as the mentioned nine
announcements would have added up to an ARR of 14.8% – all comes
down to checking announced ARRs against the (presumed)
“objective” FRAND level of the ARR and accepting only those
announcements as relevant which correspond to the objective level.
Under such an approach, individual ARR announcements can still
have informative value for determining the objective FRAND ARR
against which they are subsequently measured. But it would be
misleading to consider them as “pledges” which add some substantial
form of legal commitment to the obligations springing already from
the ETSI FRAND declaration.
Summing up, when deciding a particular case it may be
attractive to selectively consider some of the public royalty
announcements made by SEP holders as a form of legally binding
“pledge” because this may appear to provide stable grounds for a top-
down royalty determination. As a general framework, however, this
approach generates more problems than solutions. Using, as it is the
Court’s tendency in Unwired Planet, all available ARR
announcements as indicative criteria in the determination of an
“objective” FRAND ARR (while not necessarily attributing the same
weight to all of them) seems – subject to general concerns regarding
156 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 22–25.
157 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 24.
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top-down methodology (cf. below VI.6.) – the more convincing
approach.
2. Calculating portfolio size
Top-down methodology necessitates quite a precise account of the
pertinent SEPs in general and the part of these SEPs held by the
respective patentee. The Courts in both TCL v Ericsson and
Unwired Planet have to largely rely, for this account, on party-
submitted data and they both struggle with the shortcomings in these
submissions. This evidences, yet again, that a core weakness of the
entire SEP/FRAND system lies in the absence of a neutral player that
effectively checks and approves true, or at least likely, standard-
essentiality of declared SEPs,158 thereby also lending more credibility
to the entire top-down exercise.
Absent such external assurance, the evidential weight given to
TCL’s SEP assessment and Huawei’s HPA study respectively became
of crucial importance in the cases at issue. In part of their
methodology and of the experts employed, both assessments appear
quite similar. Nonetheless, they encountered a different reaction from
the two Courts, in particular regarding the question whether the
resources invested were sufficient to generate tolerable results. Justice
Birss denied this, which appears convincing given the short time
invested per patent (30 minutes) and the fact that patents were not
even entirely read in the process. Judge Selna, surprisingly, is content
with the SEP-counting part of the TCL-submitted study although it
presumably invested even less time (20 minutes) into each patent.
From the viewpoint of keeping litigation costs within certain limits,
the USD 10.000-per-patent assessment (purportedly) undertaken by
license pools seems very extensive, indeed. As a matter of principle,
however, the selection of patents to-be-licensed through a patent pool
and the identification of SEPs to-be-licensed as part of a Court-framed
FRAND license differ not as strongly as the Court suggests. While
Judge Selna agrees, as it were, with Justice Birss that not reading the
entire patent is a major flaw, the decision goes on to say that, in sum,
the study’s weaknesses do not suffice to discard it. No closer
explanation is offered of how the gravity of the perceived flaws was
measured and where the threshold for (no longer) accepting results
from the study lay. The cross-check of the study’s result against
another expert assessment cannot really remedy this somewhat
158 Commission, ‘Setting out the EU approach to Standard Essential Patents’
(Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and
the European Economic and Social Committee) COM (2017) 712 final, ch 1.2.2.;
Peter Georg Picht, ‘The ECJ rules on standard-essential patents: thoughts and issues
post-Huawei’ (2016) 37 ECLR (9) 365, 374–75.
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unsatisfactory reasoning as the analysis used as a check was equally
carried out by experts close to TCL. Dissatisfaction with Ericsson’s
decision to offer a different calculation method instead of a full-blown
top-down analysis and with the company’s claim-chart selection may
have been a motive underlying this part of the TCL decision. In the
attempt to reach a reliable general framework for FRAND
determination, though, such case-specific, procedural considerations
present no great help.
The same is true for the – rather numerous159 – instances in
which both Justice Birss and Judge Selna revert to “best guesses”
informed by and sometimes somewhere in the middle between
numbers submitted by the parties. Such estimations imply a high
degree of subjectivity instead of an abstract rule that could be applied
across case-borders. Unavoidable as some “mid-point guessing”
probably is, it should be as limited as possible.
An intricate Conflicts of Laws issue arises where Judge Selna
states that expired patents must be discounted from Ericsson’s
portfolio, and the royalties based on them from the overall FRAND
royalty rate, because US patent law forbids post-expiration royalties
and “FRAND cannot permit what domestic patent law prohibits”.160
Precedents like Brulotte161 and Kimble162 lend support to this position
as far as US-members of patent families are concerned. For instance in
the EU, though, the law is different and permits, in principle, post-
expiration royalties.163 Discounting, without further analysis, entire
patent families based on the expiration of the US-sibling only may,
therefore, constitute too much of a shortcut.
3. Value vs. numbers
The shortcomings in party-submitted top-down models get even more
severe as they proceed from SEP-counting to valuing the patented
technology. Justice Birss’s assessment of the revised MNPA and
159 cf, for instance, Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [377]–[81]: Birss taking some
form of mid-point between the estimates of the HPA and the MNPA; as well as TCL
v Ericsson (n 3) 33–50: Selna applying the top-down formula twice, once with the
numbers of TCL, once with the numbers of Ericsson. To the extent this double
calculation tries to simulate license negotiations (TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 33), one may
even criticize it as a deviation from orthodox top-down methodology, mixing top-
down with elements of a Comparables approach.
160 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 36.
161 Brulotte v Thys Co (n 71) 32.
162 Kimble v Marvel Entertainment LLC, 576 US ___ (2015), 135 SCt 2401.
163 eg Case C-567/14 Genentech Inc v Hoechst GmbH, EU:C:2016:526 [2016],
para 40; Case C-320/87 Kai Ottung v Klee & Weilbach A/S, EU:C:1989:195 [1989],
para 11; Peter Georg Picht, ‘Post signing adjustment of SEP/FRAND licenses’ (les
Nouvelles 2018) forthcoming.
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Justice Selna’s critique of available alternative technologies and
forward-citations as instruments employed to determine patent value
reflect this concern. Although it is, therefore, coherent that Judge
Selna thrashes TCL’s value analysis, the alternative solutions are not
too appealing, either. A court may – as partly done in TCL v Ericsson
– follow a counting-only approach, neglecting the argument that fair
royalties should depend on a patent’s market value164 which, in turn, is
based to a large extent on the relevance of the technology a patent
protects and on the patent’s strength.165 Or the court may guess, as
best it can, the value of the pertinent patent (portfolio), an exercise
that presents all the subjectivity concerns mentioned above. As long as
no valuation methodology is convincing and consented enough to
provide a uniform framework for determining the quality of various
SEP portfolios, this open flank will continue to weaken the reliability
of top-down royalty calculation.
4. Comparables and the non-discrimination requirement
Both in Unwired Planet and in TCL, Comparables were employed,
inter alia,166 as part of the non-discrimination analysis. The two
decisions agree that Comparables are an important tool in carrying out
this analysis and that the “ND”-prong does not categorically require
all concluded FRAND licenses to look the same since there ought to
be room for treating similar settings alike and differing ones
differently. This position can be said to have evolved into established
law on FRAND licenses.167 In two other respects, however, the
decisions differ substantially.
First, TCL v Ericsson contains no mention of a two-pronged
concept of non-discrimination similar to the soft-edged/hard-edged
framework Unwired Planet discusses. Instead, the US decision
focusses, as it were, on the hard-edged component, looking mainly at
whether the license offered to TCL is similar to those concluded with
similarly situated companies. A soft-edged criterion would ask instead
whether Ericsson offered to TCL the “benchmark” conditions to
which, in principal, all implementers of the respective standard are
entitled. TCL’s focus on the hard-edged prong stands all the more in
164 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 15.
165 „Strength“ means, in this context, the likelihood that a patent will survive validity
challenges; cf. Bret Dickey, Jonathan Orszag and Laura Tyson, ‘An Economic
Assessment of Patent Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry’ (2010) 19 Annals
of Health Law 367, 377.
166 They also served, for instance, to determine adequate license conditions with
regard to a single licensee.
167 See, for instance, LG Düsseldorf 31 March 2016 Case No 4a O 73/14, paras 256–
60; LG Düsseldorf 31 March 2016 Case No 4a O 126/14, paras 250–55; LG
Mannheim 29 January 2016 Case No 7 O 66/15, para 72.
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contrast to Unwired Planet as Justice Birss ultimately rejects a hard-
edged component altogether. Since both judges come to their
conclusions interpreting the same, French law-governed ETSI
FRAND declaration their differing readings create considerable
uncertainty for market participants active on both sides of the Atlantic.
It remains to be seen how future case-law will resolve the tension.
Second, only Unwired Planet requires harm to competition as a
prerequisite for finding hard-edged discrimination in the FRAND
sense, provided one reads a hard-edged component into the “ND“-
prong of ETSI’s FRAND declaration at all. This result is by no means
trivial or of merely academic interest since it creates something like a
threshold, treating dissimilar conditions only as a FRAND violation if
the unequal treatment is grave enough to distort competition in the
respective market. Looking exclusively at US law, Judge Selna may or
may not be correct in discarding a harm-to-competition-requirement,
thereby interpreting the ND-obligation more strictly than Unwired
Planet. Deducing this position – as TCL v Ericsson does – from a
French-law based interpretation of ETSI’s FRAND commitment is,
however, not legitimate without also taking into consideration the
CJEU’s Huawei/ZTE decision and its progeny in the form of case-law
from EU Member State-courts. This is because French national law
must comply with EU competition law.168 Assuming, on the one hand,
that the “ND”-prong of ETSI’s FRAND commitment, as governed by
French law in compliance with EU competition law, contains either no
hard-edged component at all (as is Justice Birss’s view) or a hard-
edged component that requires harm to competition (a reading Justice
Birss apparently finds conceivable) and presuming, on the other hand,
that a US court’s application of the ETSI FRAND commitment must
be coherent with the interpretation of the commitment as instructed by
French law in compliance with EU competition law (this seems to be
Judge Selna’s view), one perceives a contradiction: If TCL reads into
the “ND”-prong of ETSI’s FRAND commitment a hard-edged
component without a harm-to-competition-requirement it is either at
odds with the law governing the commitment (namely French law as
impacted by EU competition law) or Justice Birss has misinterpreted
EU and French law on his part. Several ways may lead out of this
dilemma, for instance an interpretation of ETSI’s FRAND
commitment guided by US law (instead of French/EU law) as far as
US SEPs are concerned, but here lies certainly an issue for close
consideration by a potential appeal court.
168 On the supremacy of EU law, see eg Craig/de Búrca, EU Law, 6th ed. 2015, 266
et seq.
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5. Scope of the comparability analysis
It seems right, as a general tendency, to keep the range of
Comparables broad, including numerous data points that may serve to
level out the particularities of each individual license (varying
bargaining power, etc.).
a) Local kings and global players
In assessing whether sufficient similarity exists to rate a license
among the Comparables, Judge Selna distinguishes between “local
kings” and global players. However, it may be hard to find a coherent
formula that defines whether local and global players are sufficiently
dissimilar to exclude comparability or global players sufficiently
similar to consider them comparable.
How to decide, for instance, where the local king covers a large
regional area and is economically (market share, returns) very strong
while the globally active company has a relatively weak position,
albeit in a geographically larger market – is it not possible that
economic strength and geographical scope of activity level out so as to
result in similar license conditions? And if the strong local negotiated
better conditions than the weak cosmopolite would it not undermine
the concept of non-discrimination to not consider the local’s license
when determining a FRAND license for another globally active
company? After all, the TCL Court’s treatment of very large players
like Apple or Samsung seems to be guided by the assumption that
large and powerful companies receive more favorable license
conditions, conditions that should be included into the range of
Comparables so as to favorably influence the FRAND conditions for
smaller players as well.
Furthermore, whenever the local king requests and receives a
global license because it is about to attack on new geographical
markets – would it then not be more convincing to also look at the
license instead of only at the (present position of the) licensee? And,
to give a last example, should it make a difference whether the local
king is active in the same country in which the global player’s devices
are manufactured since, in the view of the TCL court, the royalty rate
for this country sets a “global floor” for the royalties to be paid by the
global player and, consequently, the license conditions for the global
player and the local king may be more closely aligned?
In these and other intricate constellations, the Court should
rather err on the side of inclusion and consider the respective
license(s) as Comparables, so as to increase the range of available data
points.
Peter Georg Picht FRAND determination in TCL
Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition Research Paper No. 18-07
34
b) Adjusting Comparables
Driven, perhaps, by this very tendency, both Courts wish sometimes
to take a license into consideration although they are not ready to
accept it as a fully adequate Comparable. One example is Judge
Selna’s treatment of the Apple and Huawei licenses which were
concluded after the license offer made to TCL. In these instances, it is
difficult for the parties of the case, as well as for interested outsiders
(e.g. other courts), to discern how exactly the court figured in the
relevant-but-not-quite-comparable licenses (or: “weak Comparables”).
It is probably true that, depending on the circumstances, weak
Comparables can be less significant than full-fledged (or: “strong”)
Comparables and that some strong Comparables tell more about the
market value of a SEP portfolio than others. At the same time,
weighing – on a hidden scale – Comparables and attributing to them
unequal relevance may provoke the critique that a court uses this step
to align unwelcome real world-license conditions with a preconceived
FRAND level. Where a court does not deem it appropriate to treat all
Comparables alike it should, therefore, at least try to avoid opaqueness
as to how it treats different Comparables differently.
Further opportunities to “adjust” Comparables instead of taking
them as they are arise in the very complex “unpacking” operation.
Regarding floors and caps, for instance, Judge Selna discounts some
parts of Comparables entirely, stating that “caps and floors are solely
the product of negotiations, not any sort of analysis of whether they
are fair or reasonable”.169 To be sure, the license conditions in a
Comparable are the result of the circumstances under which they were
negotiated. This applies, however, to all elements of the license and
does not explain why caps and floors alone should be disregarded on
this account. Furthermore, the entire exercise of looking at
Comparables rests on the assumption that the result of negotiations
conducted with care and business acumen between informed parties
tells something about how the market values a SEP portfolio. Whether
this “market wisdom” translates into lower percent-per-piece royalties
together with a floor, a floorless higher percentage-royalty, or some
other package of conditions should not, as such, be decisive on
whether to consider it. After all, the TCL Court itself says170 that a
SEP portfolio has no pre-determined value but depends, regarding the
price at which it licenses, on how the market values it. From this
perspective, it seems more in line with the Comparables approach to
listen to the market instead of accepting or rejecting – at this stage of
the analysis – its results based on a preconceived FRAND concept.
169 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 69.
170 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 109–10.
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6. The relation between top-down and Comparables
The decisions in TCL v Ericsson and Unwired Planet v Huawei
corroborate the role of both top-down analysis and the use of
Comparables as important methods in future case-law on FRAND
license determination. These methodologies may continue to outshine
other approaches, such as a modified application of the Georgia-
Pacific test171 or inherent value-methodologies as, for instance, the ex-
Standard analysis proposed by Ericsson172 in TCL. At the same time, it
is unlikely that either top-down or Comparables will – or should –
prevail, at present, as the exclusive approach in all complex cases. Too
marked are the limitations of both methodologies. Nor should pre-
litigation party statements predetermine the (combination of) methods
to be used. This would leave room for manipulation and contradict the
idea of a universal framework for FRAND calculation.
Regarding the relative importance of the two methods, Justice
Birss favors – to a certain extent – Comparables while Judge Selna
looks more favorably at the top-down approach. Both judges use both
methods but they accord, as it were, the default role differently. In the
view of the author, Justice Birss’s position is more convincing given
the facts at issue. For sure, Comparables are not as reliable a yardstick
for FRANDly conditions as one might wish. This is demonstrated, for
instance, by the difficulties and the room for manipulation in
unpacking these licenses. On the other hand, uncertainties in the
determination of an appropriate ARR, of the total and the patentee-
owned SEP portfolio, and of the portfolio patents’ value can add up
and make top-down results quite fragile, especially when they are at
the outset based on party-submitted data and analysis.173 If only
(shaky) party-submitted data is available, judges may understandably
be skeptical and try to adjust (results based on) this data. But such
informed guesses are, by necessity, subjective and to a certain extent
arbitrary. It is quite questionable whether they should loom larger than
the collective “market intelligence” embodied in Comparables,
especially when the licenses were negotiated by experienced players
and absent impending litigation or similar pressure factors,
Top-down is, theoretically, strong in arriving at numbers for
royalties. But is it equally apt to determine other license conditions
171 Georgia-Pacific Corp v United Stated Plywood Corp, 318 F Supp 1116 (SDNY
1970); modified for FRAND-committed patents by Microsoft Corp v Motorola Inc,
No C10-1823JLR (WD Wash Apr 25, 2013), and Ericsson v D-Link,773 F.3d 1201,
1230–35; cf J Gregory Sidak, ‘Apportionment, Frand Royalties, and Comparable
Licenses After Ericsson v. D-Link’ (2016) U Ill L Rev 1809, 1854–68; however, the
Georgia-Pacific test was rejected by Judge Selna in TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 110.
172 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 50–54.
173 For instance, patentees may be biased towards decreasing the overall number of
SEPs while increasing their own SEP portfolio; implementers’ figures may be
reversely biased.
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(duration, auditing, etc.) which Comparables will, if they are
sufficiently relevant and conform to established business practice,
usually contain? Furthermore, a considerable weakness of the top-
down approach is its tendency to value all patents equally, regardless
of their individual value. An advantage of top-down calculation is its
power to set an upper threshold limiting royalty stacking, although the
appropriateness of this threshold depends on the quality of the
underlying data and even then top-down will not be able to yield a
very exact figure separating stacking from non-stacking by the
decimal place. On the other hand, Comparables may equally establish
some limits as implementers – especially the strong and experienced
ones – know the overall cost of the licenses they have taken and will
try to resist individual conditions which would, if combined with other
(pre-existing) licenses, create a severe stacking problem.
Mind you, these considerations do not suggest discarding top-
down calculation altogether and for all cases. Depending on the facts
of the case, for instance on the availability of meaningful
Comparables, top-down may even, in some cases, generate the most
trustworthy results.174 If good Comparables are at hand, though, while
a top-down analysis rests – as in UWP and TCL – to a substantial
extent on problematic data, Comparables should loom large and
produce the default results.
VII. Further aspects
As this paper focuses on the use of top-down calculation and
Comparables in the two decisions at issue, it does not discuss several
other interesting points. Among them are the impact of Comparables
resulting from ADR,175 as well as the provisions and principles based
on which both Courts come to apply French law to ETSI’s FRAND
declaration.176
Furthermore, the Court in TCL v Ericsson saw no need to decide
whether a SEP holder is obliged to make an implementer a license
offer that qualifies as FRAND since the answer to this question would
not have had material consequences in the case at hand.177 In
discussing the issue, the Court cites party submissions relating to
French (national) law but makes no mention of the CJEU’s
Huawei/ZTE decision nor of any case-law building on that decision.
This calls – again – for the remark that French national law, be it
174 As to Unwired Planet, for instance, commentators have regarded Comparables as
a particularly useful approach, Contreras (n 74) 6.
175 cf TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 82, 91; Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [171].
176 cf TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 9, 107; Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [98]–[146].
177 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 110–12.
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contract, patent or competition law, cannot be applied to ETSI’s
FRAND commitment without also taking EU competition law and the
FRAND case-law based on it into consideration.
Something like an “evergreen” is the question of whether
FRAND conditions should entitle a SEP holder to part of the value
resulting not from the initial economic potential of its patented
technology but from standardization, i.e. from the fact that the
technology was integrated into a standard and, thus, became part of a
“bundle” of technology crucial for operating on the respective
standard-based market(s). Conventional wisdom,178 including TCL v
Ericsson,179 answers strictly in the negative while the author of these
lines remains180 unconvinced by so categorical an approach: The
additional value standardization generates results from the
contributions of many parties, including patentees contributing their
protected technology, participants that further the standard-setting
process in other ways, and implementers producing and distributing
products based on the standard. In a way, even society and the state
contribute as they set the legal and economic framework
standardization needs to succeed. Given this multitude of contributors,
SEP owners should certainly not reap all the value added by
standardization. But somewhere this added value must go – if
patentees are forbidden to profit from any of it, either consumers will
appropriate it because they pay prices which are “too low” in that they
do not reflect the value of the standard as such; or implementers will
collect it by way of higher returns; or some mixed scenario,
potentially involving additional players, will evolve. Distributing the
added value seems, prima facie, fair and we cannot tell, by way of a
generally applicable formula, how the distribution should be made.
But there is no reason a SEP holder, of all parties involved, should
receive nothing of the added value. Against the background of these
reflections, it comes as a welcome surprise that the EU Commission
seems to be developing a more balanced view, judging from its recent
Communication on SEPs and FRAND.181
Although both the Unwired Planet and the TCL v Ericsson
decisions set precise FRAND royalty rates, they are in sharp contrast
178 Ericsson v D-Link, 773 F.3d 1201, 1232–33; FTC, ‘The Evolving IP
Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition’ (2011) 22–
23; Joseph Farrell et al, ‘Standard Setting, Patents, and Hold-Up’ (2007)
74 Antitrust LJ (3) 603; opposing this conventional view: Sidak (n 171) 1862–68.
179 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 15, 108.
180 Peter Georg Picht, Standard Essential Patents, Antitrust and Market Power,
December 6, 2017, http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/12/06/standard-essential-
patents-antitrust-market-power/id=90634/.
181 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council
and the European Economic and Social Committee setting out the EU approach to
Standard Essential Patents, 29.11.2017, COM(2017) 712 final, p. 6, 7.
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as to whether FRAND constitutes “a range or a dot”.182 While Justice
Birss decidedly holds the opinion that there is only one “true”
FRAND set of conditions for each setting,183 Judge Selna concludes –
and we concur - “there is no single rate that is necessarily FRAND,
and different rates offered to different licensees may well be FRAND
given the economics of the specific license”.184
VII. Conclusion
FRAND determination is a tricky business. Unwired Planet and TCL v
Ericsson contribute to the development of the law in this area but the
decisions also reveal, alone and in comparison, the numerous pitfalls
which the exercise holds. Two courts assess what seems to be a
similar set of facts and reach results which are so different that it is
hard to reconcile them. Regardless of whether the TCL approach or –
as considered here – the UWP approach produced the more
convincing results, the inconsistency between the courts’ assessments
creates uncertainty for licensors and licensees alike.  More case-law
will evolve around top-down analysis and the use of Comparables.
Hopefully, future decisions can, together with an intense scholarly
discussion, work out a coherent framework for the application of these
FRAND determination methods. In the long run, courts and the legal
system in general should work on structural improvements, such as
the increased use of court-appointed experts or impartial out-of-court
instances that access key factors like essentiality and (market) value of
patents.
182 Picht, ‘Unwired Planet v Huawei‘ (n 6) 869–70, 879.
183 Unwired Planet v Huawei (n 2) [147]–[57].
184 TCL v Ericsson (n 3) 109.
